Abstract:

T. M. Scanlon’s contractualist conception of morality has important but largely unappreciated implications for the theory of justice, especially the theory of distributive justice.  For instance, many egalitarians believe that a distribution (of goods, resources, opportunities, or welfare) can be just by its very nature, in and of itself.  But if justice is part of “what we owe to each other,” this cannot be right: a distribution across persons cannot be just or unjust, taken simply as such.  For something is owed only if it is owed to one or another individual, and distributions across persons, as such, are not the kind of thing that can be owed to a single person.  Each person is owed at most his or her particular share, given his or her “personal” reasons.  If the ultimate significance of distribution cannot lie in whether or not an impersonal distributional pattern comes about, Scanlon’s theory also tells us what is ultimately at stake: whether we, the distributing agent, stand in a certain relation, a relation of “recognition,” to each of the distinct people involved.

Communication services (sign languages interpreters, note takers, realtime captionists or assistive listening devices) are avaliavle for this event.  Contact Donald Lilly for information.  Requests for services must be submitted at least seven (7) working days in advance.

This lecture is free and open to the public.  Parking on campus costs $5.

For more information, please email Prof. Rob Gressis.